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Introduction 
 
Much of the basic non-technical vocabulary of artificial intelligence is surprisingly ambiguous. 
Some key terms with unclear meanings include intelligence, embodiment, simulation, mind, 
consciousness, perception, value, goal, agent, knowledge, belief, optimality, friendliness, 
containment, machine and thinking. Much of this vocabulary is naively borrowed from the realm 
of conscious human experience to apply to a theoretical notion of “mind-in-general” based on 
computation. However, if there is indeed a threshold between mechanical tool and autonomous 
agent (and a tipping point for singularity), projecting human conscious-level notions into the 
operations of computers creates confusion and makes it harder to identify the nature and location 
of that threshold. There is confusion, in particular, about how—and even whether—various 
capabilities deemed intelligent relate to human consciousness. This suggests that insufficient 
thought has been given to very fundamental concepts—a dangerous state of affairs, given the 
intrinsic power of the technology. It also suggests that research in the area of artificial general 
intelligence may unwittingly be (mis)guided by unconscious motivations and assumptions. 
While it might be inconsequential if philosophers get it wrong (or fail to agree on what is right), 
it could be devastating if AI developers, corporations, and governments follow suit. It therefore 
seems worthwhile to try to clarify some fundamental notions.  
 
 
1. Intelligence 
 
While there is no universally accepted definition of intelligence, it is widely held to involve 
reasoning and the ability to acquire knowledge and skills and apply them in unfamiliar situations. 
The great variety of possible skills and their measures (in education, for example) suggests the g 
factor, an ideal of general intelligence across the board.  
Yet, however formally defined, concepts of intelligence derive originally from experience 
with living creatures, whose intelligence ultimately is the capacity to survive and breed. Natural 
general intelligence is a product of a long selective process that excluded any other type of brain. 
The bulk of a natural brain is dedicated to running a body. But from this informal experience, 
gathered from creatures, is derived the modern sense of intelligence as the capacity to solve a 
range of “problems” focussing on specific human concerns. This problem-solving version of 
intelligence is a greatly constrained understanding tied to human language use, formal reasoning, 
and modern cultural goals. In the context of AI, intelligence is implicitly understood in terms of 
specific skills and knowledge prized in modern society (as in psychometric testing or in 
maximizing functions). Such a notion is narrow, while remaining ill-defined. It is 
anthropocentric, culture-bound, and even specific to a generation, while often pretending to 
universality. It bears only a distant relation to its biological origins and context. And yet it is 
supposed to provide the foundation for catchwords such as “superintelligence” and “mind-in-
general,” abstractions which continue to lack coherent meaning.  
There has been much discussion in recent years about the potentials and dangers of 
thinking machines—how they might think differently than human beings or whether they could 
ever “think” at all. The range of opinions is proportional to the vagueness of the notion. Does 
thinking refer, for example, to waking sensory experience; to memory, imagination, reverie 
(“thinking of you”); to focused contemplation or reflection (“history of scientific thought”); or to 
logic and formal reasoning? In the AI context, it often glibly means “information processing,” 
but even information remains ambiguous and problematic, despite Shannon’s formal definition. 
 In any case, formal thought occupies only a tiny fraction of either our conscious life or 
the brain’s activities, which are mostly dedicated to unconsciously regulating and maintaining 
the body in relation to its environment. The brain is first of all an organ of survival. Our feelings, 
emotions, daydreams, pleasures and displeasures, gut reactions, moment-to-moment sensory 
awareness, and many of our thoughts are all related to needs of the human body. Most of our 
daily routine (including sleep) is devoted to caring for it. Rarely are we called upon to “think”, in 
the sense of deliberate reasoning. Yet AI assumes that an artificial brain, like a computer, could 
be based on principles of abstract reasoning. A very parochial definition of intelligence becomes 
the basis of theoretically possible “mind,” abstracted and supposedly liberated from bodily 
constraints.  
The disproportionate significance of language and formal reasoning skills for modernity 
lies in their advantage for dominance over nature, other creatures, and other human groups. This 
is the main reason for the over-valuation of problem-solving skills in AI concepts of intelligence, 
and also for the failure of top-heavy GOFAI to approach the kind of intelligence manifested by 
organisms, including the human one. In other words, AI was first modelled on language and 
reasoning skills, formalized as computation, in order to extend and generalize those skills. 
Ironically, the success of this venture was then measured against the broader capabilities of the 
human organism and found wanting. The dream then shifted from creating specific tools to 
creating artificial tool users that imitate or replicate the organism. 
 
 
2. Machine 
 
In an abstract sense, a machine is a formal deductive system, consisting (like a game) of well-
defined elements, rules, and possible operations. In a tangible sense, a machine is a physically 
realized version of that abstraction. Above all, both the abstraction and its realization is an 
artifact: a product of definition. This is what renders it a deterministic system. (Conversely, the 
only truly deterministic systems are artifacts—whether physical or conceptual.) In principle, 
machines and their abstract counterparts—scientific models—are exactly what we specify them 
to be. Nature, on the other hand, was not defined by human beings, and is (presumably) not an 
artifact. We do not specify its elements or operations, about which we can only speculate. This 
drastically qualifies the mechanistic metaphor that continues to underlie science in general, and 
the assumption in particular that organisms are machines. Models of the organism (e.g., of the 
brain) are artifacts. But the body is only metaphorically a machine, the brain is only 
metaphorically a computer, and “thinking” is only metaphorically computation. Logical thought, 
formalized as computation or information processing, is a high-level human construct that is 
recycled as the theoretical basis to explain itself—a circularity that bites its own tail. 
   
 
3. Embodiment 
 
Natural intelligence is embodied. But is “embodiment” a condition that can be simulated or 
artificially implemented? Is it just a matter of hooking up a “mind” to an arbitrary choice of 
sensors and effectors? Such an idea is the modern counterpart of the “brain-in-a-vat” first 
introduced by Descartes, who proposed that experience could be deceptively fed to one’s 
consciousness by some other source than one’s natural senses. In this thought experiment, 
Descartes found support for the existence of a mind (self) that is independent of a body. If such a 
free-standing mind can exist, detached from its natural senses and motor capabilities, then surely 
it could be retrofitted with artificial sensors and effectors—indeed, an artificial body? The 
abstract concept of “mind in general” that underpins AI is thus disembodied in principle. The 
desired corollary is that it can be re-embodied in a variety of ways, as a matter of consumer 
choice.  
While an artificial brain might indeed be wired to an artificial body, producing a robot, 
would that be an artificial organism? Would it constitute a mind? A natural brain might indeed 
be connected to a range of prosthetic devices. But could a natural brain be disembodied as a 
program, to be re-connected to a natural or artificial body? Would that reconstitute a natural 
person?  
The short answer to such questions is: no. A robot is not an organism and is not 
embodied. Conversely, no natural mind can be disembodied. For embodiment is not simply 
physical instantiation of a free-standing abstract system, but a history of relations with an 
environment (including other creatures) that develops through natural selection. Minds, like the 
brains that support them, are organs of bodies. And a “body” is not simply a physical system, but 
an autopoietic system that is the product of an evolutionary process involving a whole ecology.  
While an organism is part of an ecology, its relative autonomy as a unit means that it is 
self-regulating, self-maintaining, self-reproducing, and self-defining. It can adapt by changing 
itself even on a microscopic level. Its primary output is itself. On the other hand, robots, 
machines, and tools in general are allopoietic systems, designed by human intention to produce 
something besides themselves that is of use to their creators. They are products of human 
definition and exist through intervention external to the system. Embodiment is not a physical 
state that can be artificially duplicated, independent of time or context. Rather, it is the result of 
an historical and ongoing relational process that may be impossible to duplicate.  
Can an evolutionary environment be simulated in computers? While Artificial Life 
software may be developed this way, it does not constitute real life and is not physically 
embodied. The idea might be to evolve simulated mind in an artificial environment and then 
connect it to an interface with the real world. The supposed advantage is that such programs can 
develop much faster since they do not depend on successive generations that take significant real 
time, as in natural evolution where genetic software depends on generations of wetware. But this 
begs the question of whether the software of an artificial mind can develop in such a 
disembodied state. In other words, is the evolution of a simulation really a simulation of natural 
evolution? Considerations to follow suggest that the answer is no.  
  
 
3. Simulation 
 
Formalization is the funnel through which one thing can be considered analogous to another, or 
even identical. ‘A rose is a rose is a rose’ has the truth of tautology. But there are many varieties 
of rose and each actual flower is different. An airplane “flies”, but not as a bird does. A model 
airplane may actually fly like a real one because it is a real aircraft, although reduced in scale. 
That is, one artifact can readily simulate another when they instantiate the same design, since 
they are both products of a common definition. To simulate a natural object or process is another 
matter. Creationism notwithstanding, there is little reason to believe that natural objects are 
designed; but even if they were, we have no inside knowledge of that design, about which we 
can only speculate. 
 In fact, this is true not only in regard to simulating organisms, but as a general principle 
regarding the limits of scientific knowledge. The Bohr model of an atom is a simulation of the 
real atom, about which the empirical evidence is merely statistical. Any scientific (mathematical) 
model is an idealization and a product of human definition, whereas the real phenomenon it 
describes is not a product of human definition and corresponds only approximately to the model. 
The model is an artifact in its own right, which might perfectly correspond to some other artifact 
and serve as a blueprint for its production. But no model of a natural reality can ever be proven 
complete or perfect (else there would be an end to science). It is therefore fundamentally 
unreasonable to assume that a brain, for example, can be perfectly simulated. A key question, 
however, is whether it could be mimicked well enough to result in an artifact that demonstrates a 
conscious mind—perhaps with even the same personality and memories as the real individual it 
copies. Phantasies of uploading and downloading human minds depend on this dubious 
assumption.         
 
 
4. Mind 
 
The functionalist view of mind is that it resides in organization and structure rather than 
particular materials. This presumes that this organization and structure can be correctly, if not 
exhaustively, identified. This in turn has lent credence to some AI projects, on the assumption 
that such organization and structure can be duplicated in a non-organic infrastructure. But this is 
precisely the assumption questioned above. We are dealing always with our own analysis of 
structure and organization—models—and never with the reality itself. What results will be an 
artifact, not a clone or duplicate of the original.  
 The concept of mind in general, as it has developed in AI, is not a generalization of the 
actual instances of mind with which we are familiar—that is, organisms on planet Earth. Rather, 
it selects isolated features of human performance as the basis for a theoretical system designed 
from scratch—an artifact. But designed with what purposes in view? This very selectivity 
suggests a concrete tool rather than mind as tool user with its own purposes.  
‘Mind’ is a notion at least as nebulous as ‘intelligence’. For one thing, it can refer either 
to (objective) behavior produced by a system or to the (subjective) experience we know in 
human consciousness. This ambiguity leads in two contrary directions: sophisticated 
computational tools that behave as we intend, versus artificial persons as unpredictable as their 
natural counterparts. We know that mind (in either sense, as behavior or as experience) is 
manifested by human brains. So, the project to artificially produce a mind by emulating the brain 
(and perhaps enhancing from there) may seem more feasible than building a mind through sheer 
programming. Yet, for reasons mentioned, it remains questionable whether it is possible to 
emulate a real brain well enough and in sufficient detail to recreate all its functioning. 
Furthermore, we ought to question the end as well as the means. Apart from creating a powerful 
tool with broad capabilities, why should we want to re-create consciousness? 
 
 
5. Consciousness 
 
Like ‘mind’, ‘consciousness’ is an ambiguous term with several meanings. In particular, it can 
refer to a faculty (behavior) of cognition (as in “consciousness raising”); or it can mean 
phenomenal experience (as in “conscious of time passing”). These are two aspects of the same 
thing, according to whether the point of view is that of the subject in question (first person) or of 
another subject acting as observer (third person). The faculty we call consciousness is a 
specialized function of the brain, which otherwise operates non-consciously. The experience of 
being conscious is “what it is like” to be that specialized faculty in operation, rather than to 
observe it from outside.1  
Consciousness looms disproportionately large in the life of human beings, who identify 
almost exclusively with their conscious experience. However, ever since Freud it has been 
recognized that consciousness is merely the tip of the mental iceberg. Since most of the brain is 
dedicated to running the organism without conscious attention, so most of mind consists of non-
conscious operations. It is therefore misleading to identify mind with consciousness, and 
misguided to base a concept of artificial mind on aspects of intelligence derived from limited 
aspects of conscious thought. 
 Consciousness is appropriate and necessary for the kind of system in which it occurs 
naturally, serving a specific purpose. (It is not epiphenomenal.) Yet, one might propose to create 
consciousness artificially as a goal in its own right, or for its own sake, as though it were an 
optional luxury unrelated to serving a body. In natural minds, consciousness registers input in a 
representational system: input is interpreted in relation to an internal model. Compared to 
unmediated reflex, consciousness involves a higher-order response that allows for planning and 
wider behavioral options. It usually is occasioned by situations that demand attention because 
they cannot be accommodated by habitual (non-conscious) responses; or because, being a 
function of distance, there is time for considered response in addition to reflex. 
 The experience of pain, for example, often occurs as a secondary response, in addition to 
a primary reflex—as when the hand automatically withdraws from contact with a hot surface. If 
that reflex does not successfully avoid tissue damage, then we feel pain as an ongoing sensation. 
The sensation itself (the painfulness) is a valuation based on a prolonged and self-generated 
signal indicating tissue damage. The brain sends a memo to itself that the damaged tissue must 
be favored and protected, to avoid further damage and facilitate healing over time. That is the 
meaning of the painful sensation. This implies that there must be an inner function to which this 
message is meaningful, which manages the affairs of the body that cannot be dealt with 
effectively using existing non-conscious routines. Some authors have used the metaphor of the 
CEO of a corporation: an inner agent that is also an epistemic subject and the basis of a self.  
                                                
1 The “observer”, of course, is a separate first person or subject. 
 In the case of pain at least, consciousness is not a superfluous addition to the behavioral 
responses associated with it. Yet, much of conscious experience (such as visual experience) does 
not seem to involve any necessarily associated behavior. This is largely because the distance 
senses allow time for considered response, in contrast to the immediacy of physical contact.2 Part 
of the job of the “CEO” is to monitor the environment in a manner that allows for planning. 
 
 
6. Values 
 
The organism is constantly involved in valuation, which is the basis of judgment and decision 
making. It has precisely the values it has because natural selection has ensured that only 
creatures with such values exist. The conscious experience of valuation is feeling, which reflects 
the intentions of the organism.3 In other words, feeling occurs in and via the body; it is the very 
basis of cognition, through which the organism represents to itself its own state and its relation to 
the world in terms of its priorities. Bodily sensation is feeling, which is obvious in the example 
of touch or pain. But colors and other “qualia” are equally feelings, in their respective sensory 
modes. While sensations are not always clearly pleasant or unpleasant, judgment is involved in 
any discrimination. Qualia are the conscious experience of how the (human) organism represents 
such discriminations to itself.4 Higher-level valuations, such as social and ethical values, are 
equally a function of the (human) biological/social organism, even when they are promoted as 
ideals with some universal or Platonic existence (beauty, truth, justice, good and evil, etc.). 
 AI is generally designed for “rational” purposes—to serve some need or gain some 
advantage. This concept of rationality is borrowed from economics and game theory—to mean 
essentially self-interest. It is generally assumed that an autonomous AI would behave rationally, 
in the sense of maximizing its “utility functions.” Yet, it is always relevant and essential to 
clarify whose values are involved. Organisms have their own intentionality and priorities by 
definition. Unless it constitutes an autopoietic (truly autonomous) system, an AI manifests only 
the intentionality and priorities of its programmers, expressing their values. But the value for 
humans of creating a labor-saving or capacity-enhancing tool is different from—and at odds 
with—the value of creating an autonomous system (tool user). The lesson for the AI theorist is: 
know thyself. 
 Talk of the perceptions, beliefs, goals or knowledge held by an AI is a convenient way of 
speaking. It is a shorthand that lends to the program the meanings in the mind of the 
programmer. Concepts such as “search space,” “belief state,” and “knowledge base” similarly 
project human notions. A knowledge base, for example, consists of sentences (“facts”) 
formulated by human beings; they are not things in the real world and their meanings are not 
articulated by the computer. So far, the intentionality involved is that of the human programmer, 
not the program. While convenient, laxness in language confuses the threshold issue, since it is 
conceivable that a program will one day actually manifest its own intentionality, which could be 
quite different from that of the programmer.   
                                                
2 A sharp sound can make you jump before you properly cognize what it represents; and even some visual 
cues produce an involuntary response, as when you first “see” a spider in a clump of dust. But these 
experiences of the distance senses illustrate the difference between reflex and secondary response. 
3 ‘Feeling’ is used here in a broader sense than ‘emotion’ but includes it; ‘intention’ is used in a broader 
sense than conscious intention. 
4 Color experience, for example, discriminates wave-length among other things. 
 
 
7. Can friendliness be programmed and unfriendliness contained? 
 
The short answer is no! But let us see why. Values are an embodied aspect of the organism’s 
autonomy. The idea of programming values of the human organism into an AI is either trivial or 
contradictory, depending on whether the AI is a tool or is itself an autonomous agent. If it is a 
tool, it implicitly reflects the values and needs of the programmer. If it is a truly autonomous 
system it will have its own values and needs. While no such truly autonomous AI yet exists, if it 
did programmers would only be able to transfer their values to it in the limited ways that adults 
transfer their values to children, or governments to their citizenry, or masters impose their values 
on animals or slaves.  
 The very concept of Artificial General Intelligence is self-contradictory. On the one hand, 
its vaunted advantages lie in capabilities that exceed the level and breadth of human capabilities, 
do not require direct human supervision, and would even lie beyond human comprehension. The 
motive (presumably) is for AGI to remain under human control as a tool, to serve human goals 
and values, and to act for human benefit. Yet, it is questionable whether a tool can have the 
desired capabilities without being fully autonomous and thus beyond human control. The idea is 
to create a loyal servant that would remain “friendly,” despite having its own values and 
priorities that may conflict with the programmer’s. Perhaps it is imagined that there is a margin 
within which one can have the proverbial cake and eat it too: a superior tool that is relatively but 
not quite fully autonomous, which can be programmed or trained to be friendly and serve human 
interests: a tame genie that goes voluntarily back into its bottle. If there is a such a margin, it is 
likely narrow and implies instability. It needs to be carefully explored in thought before in 
practice. But the basic unavoidable trade-off is between autonomy and control. 
The notion of containment usually implies isolation from the real world. Unfortunately, 
complete denial of physical access to or from the real world would mean that the contained AI 
would be inaccessible and useless. There would have to be some interface with human users or 
interlocutors just in order to utilize its abilities.5  
 
 
8. Tool, tool-user, or between? 
 
By traditional definition, a machine is specified by human design and intentionality. It serves as 
a tool, which is an implement to accomplish an agent’s purpose. Computers that are programmed 
top-down, as in GOFAI, conform to this definition of machine and serve specific purposes as 
tools.  
 Some systems, such as neural nets, complicate and evade this definition because their 
operations can no longer be tracked; the system is no longer clearly specifiable.6 The physical 
system (hardware) may seem to be a machine in the traditional sense, yet its state cannot be 
                                                
5 A possible solution to this dilemma might be a situation that is the inverse of the Matrix scenario. The 
AI would “live” strictly in a simulated world, never allowed to suspect that there exists anything else. 
Their self-development would occur purely through interactions within that virtual world, defined by 
humans, who would interface as avatars in that virtual world. But just as the humans in the film figure 
their way out of virtual containment, so might an AI.  
6 Cf. the parallel situation in mathematics, where a computer proof is too complex to follow.  
identified as a product of human definition or intent, but appears to be a result of self-
organization. From the point of view of the programmer or an external observer it becomes a 
black box, on a similar footing as organisms have always been. While the mechanistic view of 
organisms insists that the content of the black box can be known as though it had been designed, 
the practical truth is that we have only theories or models of what goes on inside. Unlike the 
designed artifact, we can only speculate on its structure, functioning, and principles. This is a 
fundamentally different relationship from the one we have to designed artifacts, which in 
principle do what we want and are exactly what we say they are. Ironically, while the neural net 
is initially designed, like the organism it becomes an unknown. This situation establishes an 
ambiguous zone between a fully controllable tool and a fully autonomous agent with the 
potential to be a tool-user itself, pursuing its own goals—in other words, an entity controllable 
by people only in the way that natural organisms are. With neural nets, we have already entered 
this zone and should proceed with caution, since it signals a loss of the control traditionally 
assumed for machines. 
If there is a key factor leading technology irreversibly beyond human control (the 
singularity7), it is surely the capacity to self-program based on learning, combined with the 
capacity to self-modify physically. While either capacity greatly enhances the power of a 
machine as a tool, it also renders it essentially uncontrollable. The characteristic of life that (so 
far) renders it un-machinelike is its ability to reproduce and to self-modify (adapt) even on a 
microscopic scale. No doubt re-creating these abilities artificially is a very tempting goal—but 
one to avoid at all costs.  
While some AI proponents do not aim only for useful tools, but also to create tool users 
in their own image, one should be very clear about the difference and be wary of the latter. For, 
there is no guarantee that an AI capable of reprogramming itself can be overridden by a human 
programmer. Similarly, there is no guarantee that programmable nanites would remain under 
control if they can self-modify and reproduce. If we wish to retain control over technology, it 
should consist only of tools in the traditional sense—systems that do not modify or reproduce 
themselves. Theorists should ask themselves whether the notion of an autonomous tool—
however alluring—is anything but an oxymoron and a naively fatuous wishful thought.  
  
 
9. Threshold of singularity 
 
Increasing autonomy for technology is sought because of the contemplated advantages of an 
ideal tool—one that can manage and improve itself (perhaps even reproduce itself) with 
relatively little human input. There may be a definable threshold between tools that extend 
human power, but remain within human control, and fully autonomous entities that cease to be 
tools and elude human control. If so, it should be a priority to clearly identify that threshold and 
never cross it. 
 The ambiguous zone already occupied by neural nets represents an intermediate 
possibility with a specific danger: artifacts that develop themselves independently of human 
intent, and out of control, yet are not autopoietic systems. If such artifacts are physical and have 
the ability to self-replicate (like von Neumann machines) as well as self-modify, they might 
potentially establish their own artificial environment, competing for resources with the natural 
                                                
7 Some people understand “singularity” to mean achieving human-level intelligence; but that is a distinct 
issue from loss of control over runaway technology. 
one and even displacing it. Some posthumanists laud the prospect of artificial life, since organic 
life on this planet is doomed to eventual extinction by the demise of the sun, if nothing sooner. 
Artificial (non-organic? silicon-and-steel?) entities could possibly survive in a broader range of 
environments and indefinitely into the future. Their “thinking” could operate at the speed of 
electricity rather than ion flows in wetware. There is no guarantee, however, that this artificial 
nature would evolve consciousness or even sentience. Sentience and consciousness are strategies 
of natural replicators for homeostasis—in other words, based on the very fragility of organic life. 
If the advantage of artificial replicators is to bypass that fragility from the outset, then their very 
robustness might also avoid or alter the premise of evolution through natural selection that gave 
rise to natural sentience in the first place. This is a theoretical question that needs further 
exploration.  
The scenario of a non-sentient takeover concerns nanotechnology as much as AI. From 
the point of view of human beings—even posthumanists—the horrifying possibility would be a 
universe overrun by mechanical self-replicators devoid of sentience, an artificial ecology that 
fails to evolve the consciousness we so cherish. (Imagine something like Vonnegut’s ‘ice nine’, 
which could escape the planet and replicate itself indefinitely with the materials of other worlds. 
For that matter, imagine viruses with that capability.)  
If life happened simply because it could happen, then possibly (with the aid of human 
beings or parallel agents on other planets) an insentient but robust and invasive artificial nature 
could also happen. Perhaps we are not in a position to judge such an eventuality, as we are not in 
a position to judge—only to wonder at—the existence of life on this planet. However, it would 
not seem to correspond to any human value, motivation or hope—even those of posthumanists.  
 An alternate scenario is already under development: the possibility of computation by 
means of cultured living cells—literal neural networks. The immediate purpose may be to create 
new tools, but some people imagine the possibility that such devices could self-organize into 
beings with superior intelligence. This raises even more questions than silicon-based AI. While it 
might seem more feasible in some ways to approach superintelligence through biology (by 
emulating the brain, for example) than conventional programming, it would not have the 
advantages of electronic speed or non-biologic durability. Beyond creating specific tools, what 
then would be the point? 
  
 
10. Motivation 
 
Theorists and programmers have a moral duty to clarify their own values and motivations and be 
up front about them, and also to clarify the choices and dangers AI poses to the human 
community and the planet. In addition to confusion about what is possible, there is little 
consensus about what is desirable. Some transhumanists believe that AI is the next stage of 
human evolution and that superior artificial minds or organisms will and should supersede the 
human form and would manifest superior consciousness. Some believe technology will extend 
their personal lives indefinitely, in either an embodied or disembodied state. Some critics fear 
that forms of advanced machine intelligence devoid of sentience could take over the planet and 
even the universe, driving consciousness to extinction. Some sci-fi authors envision that AI and 
natural intelligence can productively coexist, bringing untold general wealth and leisure. For 
others, AI serves as a new sort of companion (cf. domestic robots, as in the film Bicentennial 
Man; sexbots, as in the film Ex Machina; or “operating systems” as in the films Her and 
Transcendence). If the sky is the limit, humans might even finally give tangible birth to the 
god(s) they have always worshipped and longed to emulate: a society run by AI overlords that 
might or might not be benevolent. All these possibilities indicate a spectrum of beliefs, values, 
and motivations.  
 But why do any of this? For profit? Out of laziness, to live in a world where all 
production (even intellectual) is automated? Simply because someone else inevitably will? Is the 
hidden goal to mimic female powers by creating a male version of life? Is it to steal the envied 
fire of the gods? Is it to deliberately re-create even that part of nature that is ourselves, in our 
haste to pave over paradise and thumb our noses at mankind’s historical dependency on the 
natural world? Are we so lonely on this glutted planet that we must create new breeds of 
consciousness with which to interact? Are we trying to re-create a benign God to watch over us? 
Or is the motivation more conventional but sinister: to convert the means of production (human 
labor) totally into capital (robots), owned by the tiny elite that already hoards more than half the 
world’s wealth? Or, despairing of that very trend—and the sad lot of much of humanity 
already—is it on the contrary to push a reset button and start afresh with new forms of “life” that 
might behave more sensibly?  
Science has done its best to disown and mask the subjective intentions behind its quest: 
not only to study nature, but also to control it and achieve god-like powers. The irony of AI is 
that it redefines intelligence as devoid of the emotions and values that actually motivate it. 
Dangerously, the right brain knows little of what the left brain is doing. The philosophical and 
moral gauntlet that AI throws down involves age-old questions and some very contemporary 
ones. One cannot afford to approach these questions with less than full awareness of one’s own 
motivations.  
  
 
11. Who is we? 
 
It is easy and convenient to speak for humanity as a whole. But there is simply no united “we” to 
consider how to handle the prospects of AI on behalf of the species, let alone the planet. Instead, 
there are various groups with diverse and conflicting interests. There is already a transnational 
economic elite that controls most of the world’s assets—abetted by the people who work for 
them. Will not new technology simply further their aims and entrench their power, as it has 
always done in the past? Technological advance has benefitted humanity very unevenly, a trend 
that can only accelerate under present social values. There is also an elite of (mostly male) 
programmers and theorists, who are directly in a position to play god and some of whom intend 
to do so. There are sober and hysterical-sounding “experts” on both sides. There are enthusiasts 
and detractors on the sidelines, as well as the overwhelming majority of people and creatures on 
the planet who don’t know or care. But there is no we. 
 
 
12. Who, indeed, is I? 
 
Beyond the prospect of extending the life of the body, one (transhumanist) hope is to preserve 
the consciousness of the individual indefinitely. Yet, one may ask, why do we fear an end to our 
conscious experience? And what is the conscious self that it should be valued apart from the 
body? In religious days, it was the soul, a quasi-material ectoplasm with moral and legal 
responsibilities. In psychology, it is the ego, which mediates between the external social world 
and the organism. In philosophy and ordinary language, it is the subject of experience as 
distinguished from objects of experience—at once a (mere) point of view and the seat of 
consciousness. In the present context, it is a function within the brain—a high-level internal 
manager within an autopoietic system. While the soul was deemed immortal, any brain function 
expires with its brain. Death puts an end to bodily experience. If there is no afterlife or 
possibility of disembodied experience, it deprives us also of consciousness forever. But, what is 
the value to the person of that consciousness, such that one would wish at all cost for it to 
continue indefinitely?  
 Transhumanism proposes escape from mortality as a technological option—indeed, a 
consumer option. If the brain can be emulated as a computer program, then so could the 
personality, memories, identity, and the very consciousness of the person. While the physical 
brain must die, the digital essence of the person might live on in cyberspace or be downloaded 
into a new organic or artificial body. This fantasy returns us to an essentially religious, perhaps 
superstitious, conception of an immaterial essence of the person, separable from the body; 
ironically, it is supposedly endorsed by physicalism. It harks back to Descartes’ original 
conundrum that the contents of consciousness could be falsified.8  
Immortality is an age-old human aspiration, once pursued as religious belief and now 
updated as technologically feasible—whether through enhancements and replacements of the 
physical organism, through digital simulation, or some combination. Yet, putting aside 
feasibility, why would one wish to live indefinitely? Of course, nature has programmed the body 
to try to survive; and the self is the avatar of the body within the natural virtual reality we call 
consciousness. In the system of nature, however, death is the price of life—which evolved 
through the mortality of succeeding generations. Individual cells submit to this plan, forfeiting 
their individuality to the organization of an ongoing larger entity. But even cells are programmed 
to die after so many divisions. Individual human beings play a role like cells in the destiny of the 
species. We play our brief part, then withdraw to make place for another generation to play 
theirs. The cell that refuses to die is malignant.  
One could believe (and others might concur) that the contents of one’s own mind deserve 
to be archived indefinitely for the use of future generations. But that is quite different than 
carrying on indefinitely as a productive thinker. And such productivity is a different matter than 
merely continuing as a consumer of experience. We can imagine, furthermore, that an “Einstein” 
expert program might usefully simulate Einstein’s style of thought without resurrecting his 
subjective consciousness, let alone his body. It would be a tool, not a person. It would take up 
negligible space on the planet. While the same could be said for simulations of lesser intellects 
(with lesser usefulness to future generations), it is an unreasonable hope that such simulations 
would be conscious persons. 
In any case, one’s attachment to personal ongoing conscious existence does not seem to 
hinge rationally on merit. It merely reflects the programming of the organism to survive, 
combined with the archaic superstition that mind is separable from body. A conscious self or ego 
                                                
8 The reason Descartes gives for rejecting this possibility is that God (being good) would not allow it. 
How good, however, is a God who condemns non-believers to eternal pain? Such a being smacks far 
more of human vindictiveness. This should remind us that if eternal bliss is feasible in a digital heaven, 
then eternal pain should equally be feasible in a digital hell. In other words, there could literally be fates 
worse than death. If ‘I’ can be maintained in a computer simulation, then whoever (in the real world) 
controls the simulation also controls ‘my’ experience, for better or worse. 
is no more (or less) than a function of a brain, which serves the needs of a body that is not well 
designed to survive beyond reproductive age. This sad truth reflects nature’s inefficiency from a 
human point of view. (After finally accumulating a lot of useful information, and just as we are 
beginning to get some wisdom, we die and it all goes to waste!) But does this body, with its 
mind, warrant prolonged existence merely because it clings to it? A whole generation of 
individuals may succeed in extending life simply because they are able to, technologically and 
financially. What use will they make of their extra time? 
 
 
13. Quo vadis? 
 
A number of authors cite the term ‘cosmic endowment’ to describe and endorse the indefinite 
colonization of other planets, stars, and galaxies—even imagining the conversion of all matter in 
the universe into “intelligence” or “consciousness”—just as the conquistadors sought to convert 
the new world to Catholicism while pillaging its resources. This is a political agenda at heart, an 
extension of manifest destiny and lebensraum. Endowment is a legal concept of property rights 
and ownership. How culture-centric can we get? 
 On the other hand, Fermi’s Paradox could apply: if the universe is teaming with 
intelligence, perhaps even with advanced civilizations far older than ours, which pass the 
threshold of singularity and promulgate machine intelligence that multiplies throughout the 
universe, then where are these invaders? Perhaps the fact that Earth does not seem to have been 
invaded by non-organic replicators is evidence against such possibilities. Or are we the evidence 
for them? Are we simulations they keep as pets or for entertainment? On the other hand, perhaps 
civilization based on organic intelligence is everywhere doomed to exterminate itself before 
reaching singularity.  
 Such wild speculations aside, the world seems to be rapidly heading toward a 
utopia/dystopia, in which a few people (and/or machines) hold all the means of production and 
no longer need the masses either as workers or as consumers—nor as companions, and certainly 
not as voters. The entire planet could be their private gated community, with little place for the 
rest of us. Even if it proves feasible for humans to retain control of technology, it might only 
serve the aims of the very few. How consoling is it to have human overlords rather than 
machines?  
 A true alternative to a world dominated by AI might depend on dis-illusion with the 
dubious premises on which the goals of AI are founded, many of which seem also to be the 
premises on which our civilization is founded. These include control (power over nature and 
others), transcendence of embodiment (freedom from death and disease), laziness or greed 
(machines perform all tasks and effortlessly provide abundance), creating artificial life (womb-
envy), creating super-beings (god-envy), creating artificial companions (unsatisfying social 
intercourse), ubiquitous belief in the mechanist metaphor, and proselytizing “intelligence” or 
“information” (the universe is metaphorically a computer and should become one literally). Even 
if “we” could ever get past such premises, the values and mentality behind them have already led 
to current dangerous social and ecological realities. Isn’t it fatuous to imagine that AI—
following the same mentality—will do anything but produce more of the same?  
 Progress may seem as irreversible as entropy, because we moderns do not care to imagine 
going “backwards.” Yet the definition of “forward” has not been written in stone, nor even by a 
majority. In relation to machines, at least, we have not yet completely forfeited control. We can 
still imagine pursuing more innocuous goals than those behind superintelligence. Or, to put it 
another way: we can embrace a less goal-oriented life. Artists have done it in every age. Modern 
art can nearly be defined as making useless artifacts and events—things done for “the hell” (or 
the beauty) of it more than for some utility. Such invention is the timeless basis of culture. 
Technological creation builds on itself exponentially, with catastrophic environmental 
consequences. Artists also use up resources, of course, but their products do not generally use up 
resources in turn. And art can be shared. Everyone expects to have a cell phone, if not a car or 
computer—all of which depend on a vast industrial infrastructure. While not everyone can own a 
Rembrandt, nearly everyone with limited means can visit a museum, own a reproduction, or can 
themselves draw or paint, sing or dance or write or tell a story—if they choose to. Entertaining 
ourselves and each other with limited means is a value of recent history to which we could 
choose to return.  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
Concepts of general intelligence are narrowly based on human consciousness and performance. 
Yet it remains unclear to what extent an AI could satisfy the criteria for general intelligence 
without itself being conscious—or at least being an embodied autonomous entity, effectively an 
organism. The concept of AI as autonomous must be starkly contrasted with the concept of AI as 
tool. An AI is autonomous just in the measure that it is not pre-programmed; and it is 
uncontrollable in the measure it is autonomous. If it is effectively an organism, it might well be 
sentient, but could only be controlled in the ways that human beings have found to control 
natural organisms—that is, against their own priorities and self-determination, compromising 
their autonomy. Perhaps there is a margin between maximal capability as a tool and genuine 
autonomy. If the desired properties of an AI depend on “full” autonomy, then that AI would be 
fundamentally beyond human control, all the more ominous if the desired capabilities exceed 
human level and comprehension. The threshold between tool and tool user lies somewhere in 
that margin and must not be crossed. However, a self-modifying program might cross it without 
our even knowing or being able to prevent it. 
 If the AI is to be truly autonomous, then it must be embodied, which means having its 
own values and priorities (such as survival), derived through an evolutionary contest. This 
contradicts the idea of pre-programming “friendliness” to any degree beyond the ability of 
breeders to domesticate animals (even through genetic engineering). Humans pride themselves 
on their limited ability to consciously override conditioning. How much more easily could a 
superintelligent agent override the conditioning of its human progenitors? 
 A distinct danger lies within the margin between tool and tool user. Self-improving, self-
replicating technology could take over the world and beyond without ever producing what we 
value as sentience or consciousness—a machine death of the universe. 
 Socrates’ injunction to “know thyself” is all the more important for AI theorists and 
technicians, since the technology opens up possibilities that have never existed before, which 
potentially could spell the end of the human race and even of all organic life. Why one might risk 
such a catastrophe depends on motivations that should at least be known and acknowledged for 
what they are and be clearly visible on the table for discussion.  
 
